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exercise jurisprudence in Employment Division v. Smith.' Before
Smith, federal free exercise cases had been governed by the doctrine
of Sherbert v. Verner;2 laws burdening religious exercise had to be
justified by a compelling state interest. In Smith, however, the Court
articulated a new test, holding that the government need not have a
compelling state interest as long as the law burdening religious• 3
practice is neutral and generally applicable.
Smith incensed much of the academic community, who complained
that it was out of line with the normal judicial constraints: case4
precedent, original intent, and textual language. Others feared the
effects Smith would have on religious communities; they argued that
the principles laid out in Smith could not be counted on even to• 5
prevent religious persecution.
But the vitriolic attacks against Smith have decreased in fury, as
one would expect; the Supreme Court has given no sign that it will
change its mind, and so both practitioners and academics have, quite
sensibly, thrown their efforts into making the Smith test as protective
as possible. In practice, these efforts have been attempts to attack
laws as being not generally applicable. Essentially, every time a rule
6has an exception for some non-religious reason, a religious claimant
can argue-perhaps successfully, perhaps not-that making an
exception for some secular reason and not making a religious
exception effectively discriminates against religious observers. In this
manner, the general applicability requirement becomes an expansive
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 ("[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest .... ).
4. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109 (1990). See also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992)
(collecting the scholarly criticisms of Smith). Even those that supported the result in Smith
often refused to support its reasoning. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (arguing that Smith
was "neither persuasive nor well-crafted" and that it exhibited "a shallow understanding of
free exercise ... precedent").
5. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 4.
6. It is the convention to call an exception for a non-religious reason, a "secular
exception." Of course, this distinction is a gross oversimplification; one reason is that
religious groups often benefit by "secular exceptions" because they too have non-religious
needs. Yet the shorthand has become dominant and will be followed here, despite its
questionable accuracy.
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form of a disparate-treatment right.
This has seemed very promising for practitioners and academics
who favor a strong Free Exercise Clause. Recent lower court cases,
such as Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark,7 Tenafly Eruv
Association, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,8 and Rader v. Johnston, have
given the idea that a broad enough conception of the general
applicability requirement can sufficiently protect religious observers.
Thus, the current debate has focused on the internal contours of the
general applicability requirement: When does a secular exception
necessitate a religious exception? How significant does the secular
exception have to be in terms of the rule before a religious exception
becomes a constitutional right?
The understanding of the general applicability requirement
underpinning these debates is, I contend, a bit naive. The general
applicability requirement-no matter how broadly it is interpreted-
gives far less of a constitutional right than commentators have
assumed. Because a constitutional exemption depends on secular
exceptions, which in turn arise only when laws create secular burdens,
religious claimants can only receive exemptions from laws when they
create substantial secular burdens. As I hope to demonstrate, this fact
means that getting an exemption under the new Free Exercise Clause
has become a matter of constitutional luck: it depends on random,
arbitrary factors, and the protection it provides is sporadic,
idiosyncratic, unprincipled, and unpredictable. And in part because it
is dependant on irrelevant factors, the general applicability test is
completely unresponsive to the strength of the governmental and
religious interests at stake.
This article has four parts. Part I introduces the history of the
general applicability test. Part II discusses the general applicability
test in both theory and practice. In Part III, the unpredictable and
unprincipled nature of the general applicability inquiry is examined
through the lens of two quite popular cases, Employment Division v.
Smith and Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark.II The paper
continues its analysis and lays out its conclusions in Part IV.
7. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
8. 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
9. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL APPLICABILITY
General applicability, as a doctrinal concept in free exercise, is a
product of Smith, where the Supreme Court first held that laws
burdening religious beliefs do not require justification as long as theyS 12
are neutral and generally applicable. The Supreme Court there
rejected a claim by members of the Native American Church that they
were constitutionally entitled to ingest peyote as part of their
religion's sacrament, as the Oregon statute forbidding peyote use was
neutral and generally applicable. Although the Smith rule was
temporarily displaced by RFRA, 13 City of Boerne returned the general
applicability test to center stage. Since Smith (and other than
Boerne), only a single free exercise case has reached the Supreme
Court to develop how the theoretical concepts of neutrality and
• . 15
general applicability should be interpreted in practice.
In the doctrinal framework created by Smith, laws that are neutral
and generally applicable require no justification, no matter how
seriously they burden the religious claimant, or how trivial the
governmental interest is in their execution. Yet there are several
exceptions where the compelling-interest test of Sherbert is still in16 .. .
full effect. First, there is the "hybrid-rights exception" to Smith,
which holds that a free exercise claim can be made out when
claimants can show a colorable free exercise claim as well as another
independent colorable constitutional claim.' 7  The hybrid-rights
12. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. Incidentally, Smith was not the first case to use the
neutral-and-generally-applicable language. That expression appeared in a concurring
opinion by Justice Stevens in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), but actually
seems to have originated from Justice Marshall's dissent in Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), where the Court held that the Title VII religious
accommodation provision did not require employers to make more than de minimis
expenditures in accommodating the religious beliefs of their employees. See Lee, 455 U.S.
at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring); Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall appeared to believe that a rule that was not neutral or generally applicable was an
instance of outright religious discrimination. He saw the Title VII religious
accommodation issue as arising "only when a neutral rule of general applicability conflicts
with the religious practices of a particular employee." Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
14. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
16. Professor Laycock originally identified seven distinct exceptions to Smith, which
generally seem collapsible into the categories presented here. See Laycock, supra note 4,
at 41.
17. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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doctrine has been routinely criticized as untenable, and its adoption
has often been viewed as the way9 the Smith Court chose to avoid
having to overrule previous cases. Some circuit courts, believing it
fatally flawed, have ignored it completely. 2 A whole generation of21
student notes has followed the hybrid-rights exception closely; the
consensus seems to be that the doctrine is of little use to religious
• 22
claimants. Lastly, even its originator, Justice Scalia, seems to have
18. The problem is perhaps best addressed by Justice Souter in his Lukumi concurrence.
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is
simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the
hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith .... But if a hybrid
claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally
neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there
would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have
mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
19. See Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995) (describing the hybrid-
rights exception as "an unartful tool to distinguish troubling precedent"); Kent Greenawalt,
Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 323, 335 (arguing that "[m]ost scholars assume this language was a make-weight
to 'explain' Yoder that lacks enduring significance"); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division
v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 267
(stating that the hybrid theory may be just "an unprincipled attempt to pretend that Yoder
survived Smith").
20. The Sixth Circuit simply rejected the doctrine out of hand. See Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (arguing that the hybrid rights doctrine is
"completely illogical" and refusing to apply it until the Supreme Court explains further).
The D.C. and First Circuits have interpreted the doctrine as requiring another
independently viable constitutional claim-thus eviscerating the doctrine with equal
effectiveness in a different fashion. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
21. See generally William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts:
Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211
(1998); Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and
Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation " in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 833 (1993); Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights
Doctrine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119 (2000); Timothy J. Santoli, Note,
A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts are Still
Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649 (2001).
22. See Esser, supra note 21, at 242 (asserting that "[a]nalysis of hybrid claims in the
lower courts leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the hybrid 'calculus' or logical
interpretation ... simply is not being applied" and calling the hybrid claim "no more than
a smoke screen"); Fry, supra note 21, at 863 (stating that "the hybrid situation exception..
• does little to mitigate [the] effect" of Smith); Hensley, supra note 21, at 132-38 (noting
that only two circuits have given the hybrid rights doctrine real substance, and that these
courts "have left significant questions unresolved"); Santoli, supra note 21, at 672
(arguing that the Court must "define the basis of a hybrid claim" if the doctrine is going to
be tenable).
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given up on the idea.23
Second, religious claimants have state RFRAs, of which there are24
at least ten, as well as state constitutional provisions that extend the
rights of religious claimants beyond the (federal) constitutional
floor. The jury is out on the efficacy of these state RFRAs and
constitutional provisions, as many states have not adopted such
26provisions, they cannot modify federal laws, and-even when they
are applicable-it is unclear how much of a benefit they can provide
religious claimants.
23. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002), the Court held that it violated the free-speech clause for a village to require
canvassers from obtaining a permit before going on private property to canvas, solicit, or
promote a cause. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but challenged the idea that
"one of the causes of the invalidity of Stratton's ordinance is that some people have a
religious objection" to it. See id. at 171 (Scalia, J., concurring). The author of the hybrid-
rights doctrine went on to state, "If a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my
view not invalidated by the fact that some people will choose, for religious reasons, to
forgo speech rather than observe it. That would convert an invalid free exercise claim, see
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872 (1990), into a valid free-speech claim." Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
24. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571b (Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 73-401 (Supp.
2002); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 35/1 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22 (Supp.
2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251 (Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80-1 (1998); S.C.
STAT. ANN. § 1-32-10 (Supp. 2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (Supp.
2002).
25. See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes ofAge in the
State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 245-46 (1998) (noting that "at least six state
supreme courts have ... reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard of Sherbert" and that "[tihe
supreme courts of at least four other States ... have applied a heightened scrutiny standard
under their state free exercise clauses without considering the conflict with Smith").
26. The federal RFRA seems to be intact insofar as it is a modification of federal law.
See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2001); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d
950, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Christians v. Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 859-60(8th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But
see United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt as to
the continued constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal law). Some commentators
think RFRA-even as a modification of federal law-is flagrantly unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional,
Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2-3 (1998) (arguing that the federal aspect of RFRA
violates separation-of-powers principles and the Establishment Clause). Some think it
obviously constitutional. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of
Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715, 727-47 (1998) (noting
that Congress should have the power to modify its own laws). And some are in between.
See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to
Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1906 (2001)
(stressing that "courts have no basis for invalidating [RFRA's] federal law applications;
rather, courts should focus on the task of construing Federal RFRA to avoid Establishment
Clause problems").
27. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575(1998) (analyzing lower court cases and concluding that the federal RFRA did virtually
nothing to protect religious liberty and that analogous state provisions will do similarly
[Vol. 26
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Two other exceptions to the neutral and generally applicable rule
arise, but are of little concern here. The Smith Court, in altering the
constitutional test, said nothing about matters of internal church
autonomy. Several circuits have held that Smith's silence should be
construed as preserving the compelling-interest test in this narrow
28
category of cases. Another exception from Smith may be for
unemployment compensation cases, which is how Smith distinguished
Sherbert.
9
Without minimizing the results of the above four exceptions from
the Smith rule, it is clear that they all have their limitations.
Commentators both for and against tend to agree that the bulk of
constitutional protection for religious claimants will come via attacks
on laws as being not neutral and generally applicable; there is a
tendency in the literature to phrase this as being "the key" to a free
exercise claim.3 °
So we then return to the neutral and generally applicable language
of Smith, which is to govern most free exercise disputes. This
concept, which d6buted in Smith, appeared only briefly there. The
court simply stated, "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability .... "' It was not until a later case, Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, that the Court gave
little).
28. See, e.g., Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (arguing that Smith applies to free exercise
cases based on the religious conduct of individuals, not to "the ability of a church to
manage its internal affairs"). See also EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 513 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
29. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 ("We have never invalidated any
governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment
compensation.").
30. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850,
851 (2001) ("Thus, the key to understanding the Constitution's protection of religious
liberty in the post-Smith world is to locate the boundary line between neutral laws of
general applicability and those that fall short of this standard."); Douglas Laycock, The
Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 26 (2000) ("The key concept in
Smith is 'neutral and generally applicable law."'); Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against
Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 565, 572 (1999) ("The
key to the Lukumi Babalu Aye line of cases involves the scope of what constitutes general
applicability; laws whose burdens fall upon religion and little else may fall within the
Lukumi Babalu Aye principle rather than the deferential rule of Smith.").
31. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982))
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). See also id. at 878 (stating that laws burdening
religious exercise need not have external justification if the burden is "merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision").
No. 2]
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more content to the concepts of neutrality and general applicability.
32
In Lukumi, at stake were the rights of a congregation of Santeria
practitioners who challenged a set of city ordinances that proscribed
animal sacrifice. The Church had begun the process of obtaining the
necessary licensing, inspection, and zoning approvals so that the
congregation would be able to sacrifice animals, when the city passed
ordinances prohibiting the unnecessary killing of animals "in a public
or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption." 34 Frustrated with the city, the congregation and its
congregants filed suit.
The Lukumi Court first turned to the requirement of neutrality.
Since "the ordinances were enacted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' their suppression of Santeria religious practice," they were
deemed to be not neutral. 35 The Court explicitly recognized that this
definition of neutrality was being imported from the equal protection
context. The Court left its discussion of neutrality at that, but one
32. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). It seems best to split the test of "neutral and generally applicable" into its two
component parts of neutrality and general applicability. The two inquiries overlap to some
extent. See id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The
Court analyzes the 'neutrality' and the 'general applicability' of the Hialeah ordinances in
separate sections .... [b]ut I think it is not necessary, and would frankly acknowledge that
the terms are not only 'interrelated,' but substantially overlap."). But courts and
commentators seem to analyze the concepts independently, even if there is some
theoretical overlap. See Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral,
Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1075
(2000) (noting that "courts distinguish between the neutrality and general applicability
analyses by separating them into two distinct prongs," but believing that it would be
"easier to collapse them into a single test").
33. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526-27 (1993). There are several case studies on Lukumi.
See Allison J. Cornwell, Note, Sacrificial Rites Become Constitutional Rights on the Altar
of Babalu Aye, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 623 (1994); Renee Skinner, Note, The
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259 (1994).
34. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527.
35. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979)).
36. See id. at 540 ("In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free
Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases."). The Court
went on to cite Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) as examples of
how courts could determine neutrality by examining things such as "the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.
These objective factors bear on the question of discriminatory object." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at
540 (citation omitted).
One must note that this is formal neutrality, not substantive neutrality. Neutrality, like
[Vol. 26
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should note that proving a violation of equal protection is generally
perceived as difficult for plaintiffs generally, and there seems to be no
reason why the burden would be lessened in the free exercise
37
context.
As a result of the perceived difficulty of proving a lack of
neutrality, religious liberty claimants have quickly turned for refuge
to the "second requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the rule that
• ,38
laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability."
The Court in Lukumi explained:
The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,
cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the
rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The principle
underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in
our First Amendment jurisprudence. In this case we need not
define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a
prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well
below the minimum standard necessary to protect First
Amendment rights.
Respondent claims that Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71
advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing
cruelty to animals. The ordinances are underinclusive for those
ends. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers
those interests in a similar or greater degree than [the plaintiffs'
conduct does] 9 The underinclusion is substantial, not
inconsequential.
The Court summarized the generally applicable test in disparate-
treatment terms: "The Free Exercise Clause 'protect[s] religious
observers against unequal treatment."' 40 Pressing the factual analysis
further, the Court noted that "the ordinances are drafted with care to
other words in religion-clause jurisprudence, is a word whose very definition is endlessly
contested. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Towards Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (discussing possible
meanings of neutrality).
37. See generally Laycock, supra note 4 (arguing that if the Free Exercise Clause is
interpreted as simply an anti-discrimination right, then the right of free exercise is
essentially nonexistent); see also Julia Lamber, Barbara Reskin, & Terry Dworkin, The
Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553 (1983)
(documenting the difficulties of proving discrimination).
38. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
39. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 542 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 148
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)); see also Laycock, supra note 30, at 28 ("Lukumi ... is a
case about objectively unequal treatment.").
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice."
4
'
There were exceptions for fishing, exterminating mice and rats within
a home, euthanizing stray animals, and destroying animals removed
42from their owners for humanitarian reasons. What Florida could not
do, the Court stressed, was simply deem religious sacrifice of lesser
importance than secular sacrifices that threaten the same harm.
"These ipse dixits do not explain why religion alone must bear the
burden of the ordinances, when many of these secular killings fall
within the city's interest in preventing the cruel treatment of
,43
animals." Since exempting the religious believers did not pose any
more harm to the city's interest than the existing exemptions for
secular activities, the Court granted the religious believers an
exemption.
Finally, the Court created one final nuance to the "general
applicability" inquiry. The Smith Court noted that "where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason." This language could be viewed as creating a third
requirement independent of both the neutrality and general
applicability inquires. Courts and commentators, however, have
tended to view the "individualized exemptions" part of Smith to be
read as an aspect of the generally applicable inquiry.
II. THE GENERAL APPLICABILITY REQUIREMENT IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE
This, essentially, is all the Supreme Court has had to say about the
theory of the general applicability requirement. The gaps have been
41. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
42. See id. at 543-44.
43. Id. at 544.
44. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986)).
45. See Duncan, supra note 29, at 861 ("Although some commentators view the
individualized exemption process rule as [being a separate requirement] ... the rule is best
understood as nothing more than a subset of the general applicability requirement."); see
also Kaplan, supra note 32, at 1062 (noting that "courts conflate the 'generally applicable'
inquiry with the 'individualized exemptions' analysis, reasoning that where a law contains
a system of individualized exemptions it cannot be generally applicable"). Some courts,
however, do view the "individualized exemption" requirement as being a hidden third
component of the "neutral and generally applicable" test. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep.
Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (employing a three-part analysis that considers
neutrality, general applicability, and standardized exemptions as independent criteria);
Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
[Vol. 26
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left to lower courts and academic commentators to fill. Before
looking at the implementation of the general applicability
requirement, it helps to have an understanding of what, in theory, it
aims to accomplish.
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of General Applicability
Based on what the Court said in Smith and Lukumi, commentators
have viewed the theory of the generally applicable inquiry as being
something like this: as long as a law remains exceptionless, then it is
considered generally applicable, and religious claimants cannot claim
a right to be exempt from it. When a law has secular exceptions,
however, a challenge by a religious claimant becomes possible. In this
sense, the general applicability requirement gives religious groups a
sort of disparate-treatment right. The test essentially forces religious
interests to be treated on par with secular interests-when secular
interests have been given an exception, religious interests must be
given an exception as well.
To put it differently, the general applicability requirement requires
that a legislature "not place a higher value on some well-connected
secular interest group with no particular constitutional claim than it
places on the free exercise of religion.",46 When a secular interest is
preferred over the free exercise of religion, the religious observer
must be granted an exception. This requirement, commentators posit,
serves as a wa to achieve a rough equality for religious groups in a
secular world. The need for such an equality right comes from the
perceived difficulty that religious groups (who are often minorities)
can have in obtaining exceptions in the legislative sphere. 4' The
general applicably requirement, however, allows religious groups to
"piggyback" on the battles fought for secular interests in the political
branches. Whenever a secular group gets an exception, they have
automatically and unwittingly provided religious claimants with the
basis for a possible religious exception. As a result, religious groups
46. See Laycock, supra note 30, at 35.
47. See Duncan, supra note 30, at 881 ("This is an equality rule not a liberty rule,
because religious exercise is protected, not as an end in itself, but only to the extent that
analogous secular conduct is protected."); Lawrence G. Sager, Panel One Commentary, 57
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 12 (2000) (arguing that "Smith's demand for neutral rules of
general applicability is best understood as responding to [a tacit commitment to equal
regard]").
48. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 57 ("Legislative exemptions are often hard to get, and
they often require a political battle.").
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receive vicarious protection through the legislative process. A
legislature can choose to make a law exceptionless. But once it begins
to make exceptions, it must let a religious claimant out of the
regulatory structure at the same time it lets a secular interest group
out. Religious groups are further helped by the very nature of the
legislative process, which is conducive to the creation of secular
exceptions. The nature of legislation often turns on compromise;
legislators make exceptions for groups in order to win over
opposition. The general applicability requirement, at its best, inverts
the political process to protect the very groups it is prone to ignore.
In a sense, then, the general applicability test gives a sort of
disparate treatment right to religious groups. When secular interest
groups are given an exception, religious groups are also provided with
one. This is very similar to the disparate-treatment right given to
minority groups under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII. In
fact, there is a strong analogy between the work of a post-Smith free
exercise lawyer and that of a traditional race employment-
discrimination lawyer. Both look for evidence of unequal treatment.
The religious-liberty lawyer searches through legislative history and
related legislation to find some example of a secular interest being
treated better than a religious one. Similarly, an employment-
discrimination lawyer searches through an employer's files looking
for instances where employees of one race are treated better than
those of another. To give an example, perhaps an employer has
refused to hire an African-American employee and the employee's
lawyer strongly suspects racial discrimination. The employment-
discrimination lawyer then looks for examples where employees of
other ethnicities were hired despite having lesser credentials.
Similarly, the free exercise lawyer looks for statutory examples where
other interest groups receive exceptions despite the fact that their
exceptions do as much (or more) harm to the rule as a religious claim
for exception would. The similarity between these two situations
shows why it is useful to consider the general applicability inquiry as
giving a kind of disparate-treatment right. This type of right is
49. See Laycock, supra note 30, at 35 (noting that "if burdensome laws must be applied
to everyone, religious minorities will get substantial protection from the political
process").
50. Id. at 35 ("[R]eligious claimants can often prevail, because the way the American
legislative process works is to cut special deals and make exceptions for squeaky wheels.
If you let out the interest group that complains the most, you have to let out the religious
claimant as well.").
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stronger in the religious context than in the racial context. In the racial
context, the only possible comparison to the employee is a similarly
situated worker of a different race. In the free exercise context,
however, a religious claimant may be able to analogize his claims to a
variety of secular activities. As a result, the general applicability
requirement gives a more powerful sort of disparate-treatment right
than is usually seen in the racial context.
B. The Application of the General Applicability Requirement
Despite this conceptual simplicity, the general applicability
requirement offers some difficulties in implementation. Precisely
because the general applicability requirement allows a religious
claimant to analogize his claims to a variety of secular activities, the
disparate-treatment analysis is not self executing. One is faced with
an initial question that does not appear in the racial context: Is the
exempted secular activity really analogous to the religious claimant's
activity? The literature is dominated by the incarnations of this
question; it usually takes the form of a commentator pondering how
numerous and severe the secular exceptions have to be before the law
is considered not generally applicable. This question is one that has
dominated the free exercise literature. Without going into all its
details-a point of this paper is that this question is not as important
as it seems-a little background is necessary.
First, it should be noted that many commentators have argued,
often forcefully, that the general applicability inquiry should be
interpreted as simply being a prohibition on intentional
discrimination. Professor Tushnet, for example, has argued that this is
the most plausible way of interpreting the Supreme Court's decisions
in Smith and Lukumi. Others vigorously contest this interpretation.
52
51. To Professor Tushnet, the natural reading of these cases is that the Free Exercise
Clause now "protects only against statutes that target religious practice," and that "those
who offer these alternative case readings do so because they disagree with the cases'
natural reading and believe that the Free Exercise Clause ought to give religious liberty
more protection than the Supreme Court appears to believe it should." Mark Tushnet, The
Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 72 & 71 n.3 (2001); see also
Lupu, supra note 27, at 599 ("Lukumi holds actionable under the First Amendment
religious gerrymanders, laws which, upon close inspection, are designed intentionally to
disadvantage religion."). Some have found such a motive attractive on normative grounds.
See Wendy K. Olin, Note, Constitutional Survival Camp: What Are the Chances That the
General Applicability Test Will Make It?, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1029 (1995) (arguing that
the generally applicable test should devolve into solely an inquiry about legislative
motive).
52. See Laycock, supra note 30, at 28 ("Whatever else it may be, Lukumi is not a
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The government-the defendant in all free exercise claims-makes a
similar argument. It often argues that the general applicability inquiry
is tautologically satisfied, because a law is always generally
applicable to the objects to which it applies. The Court, however,
has rejected this view, stating that the rule must be generally
applicable with respect to the ends of the legislation-that is, the
Court held that the §eneral applicability requirement was really about
underinclusiveness.
On the other side, some commentators have intimated that virtually
any secular exception should create a claim for religious exception,
arguing that the Free Exercise Clause demands that religious interests
be treated as well as the most favored secular interests. Professor
Volokh has pointed out, however, that this ideal is simply impossible
to implement in reality, as virtually all laws have some secular
56
exceptions. "Even the bans on intentional homicide have
exceptions-execution of a lawful sentence, killing in war, police
killing of a dangerous fleeing felon, killing in self-defense or in
defense of another and disconnecting life-sustaining equipment at a
patient's request."
Most commentators have chosen a position between these
extremes, arguing that the presence of secular exceptions is necessary,
but not sufficient, to justify a religious claim for exception. These
commentators have generally come to the conclusion that the question
is really whether the secular exceptions endanger the purposes of the
legislation to a similar or greater degree than a religious exemption
motive case. The lead opinion explicitly relies on the city's motive to exclude a particular
religious group-and that part of the opinion has only two votes. So whatever the holding
is, it is not a holding about motive.").
53. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 344-46 (1949) (noting that the requirement of equality can be regarded
as paradoxical in that laws are always equal in applying to all objects to whom they apply,
and unequal in that they distinguish objects of regulation from those that are unregulated);
Laycock, supra note 30, at 31 (calling this argument "entirely circular").
54. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (noting that the ordinances in question are "underinclusive for [their] ends," and
that they are constitutionally infirm because "[t]hey fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct
that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does").
55. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 4, at 49-50 (arguing that religious interests should
receive this sort of"favored nation status").
56. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1540 (1999) ("But virtually all laws, including those widely seen as aiming at
quite serious harms, contain many secular exceptions."); cf Laycock, supra note 4, at 50("American statutes are riddled with exceptions and exemptions for various special
interests, small businesses, private citizens, and government agencies.").
57. Volokh, supra note 56, at 1540.
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would, although they vary in the degree of underinclusiveness they
believe is required before a court may strike down a particular law.
Using this general consensus as a starting point, we can use a useful
example by Professor Volokh-with a response by Professor
Duncan-that can serve to conclude this section by frankly
demonstrating the difficulties in the actual application of this test.
Let us examine a hypothetical question involving a person who
claims an exemption from trespass law to view an apparition of theS60
Virgin Mary (or other sacred object) on private land. One is to
assume that trespass law has exceptions for adverse possession,
necessity, and law enforcement. Volokh wants to use this example
58. See id. at 1542. This formulation of the inquiry is my own. Commentators have
adopted various different formulas that seem approximately equivalent. See Duncan, supra
note 30, at 868 ("In order to determine if a law restricting religious exercise is
underinclusive, one must ask two questions. First, what governmental purposes are being
served by the restrictive law at issue? Second, does the law exempt or otherwise leave
unrestricted secular conduct that endangers those governmental purposes in a similar or
greater degree than the prohibited or restricted conduct of the party seeking the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause?"); Kaplan, supra note 32, at 1078-79 (turning these questions
into a two-part inquiry); Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the
Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L. REv. 750, 767-70 (1999) (turning these questions into a
different two-part inquiry).
59. The Lukumi Court said the underinclusion had to be "substantial," and "not
inconsequential." See Lukumi, 505 U.S. at 543. Other commentators have formulated this
requirement in various ways. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 30, at 876 (requiring
"substantial" underinclusion in a statute before constitutional infirmity); Sansom, supra
note 58, at 769 (arguing that there must be "inconsistent" underinclusion before a
constitutional claim is viable); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise
Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 114 (2000) (requiring the law to be "so
dramatically underinclusive that religious conduct is virtually the only conduct to which
the law applies").
60. Incidentally, though few would believe it, these trespass cases actually do arise. In
United States v. Acevedo-Delgado, 167 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.Puerto Rico 2001), a minister
was arrested for entering a military reservation in Vieques without permission. He raised a
free exercise claim in his defense. It should be relatively unsurprising that the district court
took no notice of the discussions of this hypothetical in the law reviews. Instead, the
district court tersely denied the exception, holding that the "federal trespass statute at issue
... generally applies to all members of the public." Id. at 480 (citation omitted). This case
differs a little from the case of private trespass discussed above. In the case of private
property, there may be a stronger argument for preventing trespass, because the cost of the
trespass is placed on a single landowner rather than the public at large. The question of
whether the government should have the same (relatively absolute) right to exclude
trespassers as private landowners do-or whether the government must show that the
trespass would interfere with the government's use of the property-is a question that the
Supreme Court has had to address repeatedly in the context of the Free Speech Clause.
See, e.g., Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (suggesting
that the government should be vested with the same rights as any other property owner);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (suggesting that the government must
show incompatible use).
61. Duncan, supra note 30, at 875 (quoting Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of
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to demonstrate the indeterminacy of the general applicability test; he
wants to show how even intuitively easy cases become impossibly
difficult under its rubric. The answer, everyone concludes, is that the
religious observer here must be denied an exception. Yet, the fact that
there are exceptions to the no-trespass rule seems to suggest that an
exception must be given to the religious trespasser. Volokh's point is
that while everyone agrees on how this claim must be decided, the
general applicability inquiry does not give us a way to cleanly reach
the proper result. General applicability, to Volokh, is a concept that
cannot naturally reach a result that is obviously necessary, which
makes it a concept that is manipulated with ease and has little real
usefulness.
Professor Duncan, who believes that the general applicability test is
a workable approach to free exercise, seeks to defend the feasibility of
general applicability. He seeks to demonstrate that the general
applicability test does easily (and correctly) resolve Volokh's
hypothetical. Duncan believes that an exception should be denied here
because the "degree of underinclusion does not appear to be
substantial." He argues that the law enforcement and necessity
exceptions are "extraordinary and inconsequential exceptions to the
general primacy of the sanctity of private property., 63 The doctrine of
adverse possession, he argues, is "not an exception to the law of
trespass" at all, but rather a form of the statute of limitations. 64 As a
result, none of the secular exceptions undermine the rule to the same
extent that the religious exemption would, and so the religious
claimant should lose. Duncan effectively concludes that this is a
"workable test for general applicability when applied to the law of
trespass.
' 65
While this analysis seems solid at first glance and the result is
certainly consistent with our intuitions, Duncan's analysis does raise
some nagging questions. Why are the exceptions for law enforcement
and necessity "extraordinary" and "inconsequential"? And if they
are-does that discount, or does it bolster, a religious liberty claim? If
the government can accommodate the needs of law enforcement
without denigration of the entire property-rights regime, and can even
Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 595,
632 (1999)).
62. Duncan, supra note 30, at 876.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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make a secular exception for the obviously vague category of
"necessity," there seems an intelligible argument for a religious
exemption.
And why is the exception for adverse possession not to be
considered an exception? Duncan claims the exception for adverse
possession is really part of another rule-a separate rule, which deals
with when one's property rights are transferred to another. How are
we to know, in any particular case, what the rule is and what the
exceptions are? A clever government lawyer will always be able to
argue that clear exceptions are actually different rules, and a similarly
clever free exercise lawyer will be able to argue that different rules
are actually clear exceptions. There is no getting away from the fact
that there is deep uncertainty in trying to discern what the "rule" is
66
and what the "exceptions" to that rule are.
On the other hand, this does seem to be a genuinely easy case. To
put away the abstractions for a moment, it seems that granting a
religious exception would do significantly more harm to the rule than
the existing secular exceptions, regardless of whether adverse
possession is considered one of them. The necessity, law
enforcement, and adverse possession exceptions produce highly
context-dependant and individual-specific exceptions to the trespass
statute. None of them produces a continuing flow of people onto a
particular property. An exception for the religious claimant, however,
would drive a truck through this narrow hole-producing a right not
limited to a particular time, place, 7or individual. The resolution of
many cases will be very difficult, but some of them will remain
66. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 871, 874-75 (1991) ("[T]he
necessity of an exception (or lack thereof) to some legal rule is largely a function of the
array of linguistic tools then available to the drafter of the rule. Where the language in
which the rule is written contains a word or a familiar phrase that itself excludes what the
drafters wish to exclude from the scope of the rule, no exception is necessary .... But
where language does not provide any word or phrase, the scope of some primary
prescription of proscription will be defined in terms that are likely to be overinclusive,
from the perspective of the goals of the legal rule."); see also Volokh, supra note 56, at
1541 ("As Fred Schauer has pointed out, what looks like the exception and what looks like
the rule often turns on largely irrelevant factors, such as whether existing legal language
happens to contain a single phrase to describe some morally significant concept.").
67. Another hypothetical that exposes the difficulty between ascertaining the rule and
the exceptions to that rule is a religious minority's claim for an exception to celebrate a
little-known religious holiday. Do the pre-existing religious holidays already on the
calendar, such as Easter and Christmas, constitute exceptions to the rule-or is the "rule"
the Christian calendar? Depending on your conceptualization of the "rule" and the
"exceptions," the question of whether the religious claimant receives an exemption may
have different answers. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 51. For those whose instincts
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quite easy.
III. THE GENERAL APPLICABILITY INQUIRY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LUCK
The current fight in free exercise discourse, as we have seen, is the
fight over the breadth of the general applicability criterion. How
significant do the exceptions have to be before the rule fails to be
generally applicable? This fight has dominated the discussion of the
general applicability test in both the academic literature, as evidenced
in the debates between Duncan and Volokh, and also in the actual
litigation that goes on between free exercise litigants and the
government.
But the ongoing debate, I contend, has overlooked a critical point.
In order for a religious claimant to get an exception, the rule must
have existing secular exceptions. But in order for those secular
exceptions to arise, the law must create some secular burdens. The
religious believer must rely not only on secular interests to
unwittingly help him out by grafting an exception, but also on the
underlying law to create a distribution of secular burdens that is likely
to produce secular exceptions. To the extent that no secular burdens
arise and no secular exceptions develop, the religious claimant cannot
win. This is pure common sense: when a law creates secular, as well
as religious, burdens-the religious can rely on the secular interest
group to fight for exceptions. When the law creates no secular
burdens, religious groups are on their own.
As a result, a constitutional claim for exemption from a particular
law will often critically depend upon whether the law creates secular
burdens. A burden that falls selectively on religious claimants will be
immune from constitutional attack. As I hope to illustrate in the
following examples, this constitutional setup is a strange animal.
Essentially, what is required for a religious claimant to win a free
suggest that the religious minority should receive an exception to celebrate their holiday,
consider again the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Smith involved two Native
American Church members who claimed a religious exemption to Oregon's controlled
substance laws. The court found that the Oregon statutes in question were generally
applicable because peyote use was always prohibited. If the statutes in question were
reconceptualized as creating a general restriction against drug use in general, then might
the exceptions for alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs (in some circumstances) make the
restriction on peyote not generally applicable? See Larry Alexander, Are Smith and
Hialeah Reconcilable?, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 285, 287 (1996) ("[N]ote that the law in
Smith, the paradigm case of a law of general applicability, can be looked at as making an
exception for one secular value but not for a religious value. For example, why was peyote
banned but not alcohol ... ?").
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exercise case is a kind of constitutional luck. The discussion will
follow, but first I present some examples that best demonstrate my
point.
A. More Test Suites
1. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark6 serves as an
excellent illustration of how the presence or absence of secular
exceptions governs the general applicability inquiry, thus making free
exercise exemptions unpredictable and unprincipled.
In Newark, two Islamic police officers challenged internal
regulations of the Newark Police Department as infringing their free
exercise rights. Since 1971, the Newark Police Department had
maintained an internal order (Order 71-15) requiring male officers to
shave their beards. These two Islamic officers, however, refused to
shave their beards, arguing that they were religiously obligated to
wear a beard. They pointed out that several sections of the Qur'an
required Muslim men who could grow a beard to do so. The two
officers, Faruq Abdul-Aziz and Shakoor Mustafa, were questioned
about their noncompliance, and told that refusing to shave might
warrant removal from the department. Aziz and Mustafa then sued,
claming that the internal police department order violated their free
exercise rights. The plaintiffs argued several legal theories in the trial
court,and succeeded in both the trial and appellate courts on the claim
that the law was not generally applicable.
The rule had two secular exceptions; the Department allowed
beards for those officers who needed them for medical reasons and
for those who needed them for undercover operations. The
undercover exception was necessary, the Department argued, for the
protection of its officers. The medical exception was necessary to
fulfill the Department's commitments under the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires that the Department make
68. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). For a factual and constitutional overview of Newark,
see Merric J. Polloway, Case Note, Free Exercise Forbids Police Departments to
Discipline Officers Who Wear Beards for Religious Reasons When Other Secular Reasons
for Wearing Beards Already Merit Exemptive Status, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 397 (1999).
69. The plaintiffs also argued both that Smith applied only in cases involving criminal
prohibitions and also that, under Smith, they would have a valid hybrid-rights claim. The
Newark court rejected the former theory and did not reach the latter. See Newark, 170 F.3d
at 363-64.
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"reasonable accommodations" for its disabled employees. These
exceptions were considered to be necessary infringements on the
Department's "no shaving" policy, which in general tried to
encourage a uniform appearance, which would enable officers and
citizens alike to identify officers and build morale and esprit de corps.
The Third Circuit began by noting that the undercover exception
did not detract from the general applicability of the rule.7' Instead, it
was the secular medical exception that made the rule constitutionally
infirm. The medical exception, the court held, was similar enough to
the kind of claim a religious claimant would bring to mandate a
religious exception. The city then, as part of the general applicability
inquiry, had to explain why "religious exemptions [would] threaten
• . ,,72 .
important city interests but medical exemptions [would] not." Since
the city did not meet this burden, the court held that the Department's
policy would have to be evaluated under strict scrutiny, ultimately
holding that it failed to meet this high bar.
Newark has received more than its share of pages in the law
reviews. It has been heralded as a great win for religious liberty.
Commentators have generally focused on a few aspects of Newark, all
concerning the underlying issue of whether or not the rule was really
generally applicable: Did the medical exception truly necessitate a
religious exception? Does this religious claim for exception threaten
to create a flood of exceptions, making this particular claim more of a
threat to the "no-shaving" rule than a medical exception? Was the
court correct in holding that the undercover exception did not
undermine the rule? As one can see, all of these questions have at
their heart the issue explored earlier-what sorts of (and how many)
secular exceptions must there be in order to render the rule not
generally applicable?
My focus is elsewhere. Let us examine the factual scenario of
Newark more closely to find out how these secular exceptions
actually developed. The relevant secular exception-the one that
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
71. Newark, 170 F.3d at 366 (noting that the undercover exception did "not undermine
the Department's interest in uniformity because undercover officers obviously are not held
out to the public as law enforcement person[nel]") (alteration in orginal) (internal
quotation omitted).
72. Id. at 367.
73. See, e.g., Thomas Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16
J.L. & REL. 187, 193-96 (2001); Duncan, supra note 30, at 872-880; Laycock, supra note
29, at 22-23.
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resulted in a religious exception for our claimants-was the internal
regulation that allowed officers to be exempt from the no-shaving
requirement if they obtained "medical clearance," that is, they showed
some medical reason why they could not wear a beard. Now
obviously, this secular medical exception did not simply
spontaneously arise. The Third Circuit notes, very briefly and
parenthetically, that the root of the medical exception was a skin
condition called pseudo folliculitis barbae.
74
The Third Circuit leaves its discussion of pseudo folliculitis barbae
at that, and no commentators to my knowledge have examined it
either. Briefly, pseudo folliculitis barbae, otherwise known as PFB, is
a common medical condition among African and Arab-Americans
because of their extremely curly facial hair. Shaving generally causes
the ends of hairs to sharpen; they become, in effect, miniature spears.
For individuals with extremely curly hair, the hairs can curve back
into the skin, causing inflammation and severe discomfort. PFB
occurs only in African and Arab-American populations where its
incidence reaches only fifteen percent--Caucasians cannot develop it.
But while most people have not even heard of this skin condition, it
obviously does affect daily life for those who are affected by it. 75 The
best treatment for PFB is to simply let the beard grow, for when hairs
get beyond a certain length they cannot curl back into the skin.
The medical cause of PFB and its relative incidence in various
ethnic populations may seem irrelevant at first glance, but my point is
that the viability of the constitutional claim in Newark hinges on the
existence and prevalence of this skin condition. It is the existence of
PFB, its prevalence, and its incurability, that make the claim in
Newark possible because they are what created a medical exception to
the rule.
We see then how precarious the plaintiffs claim in Newark
actually was. If there were effective treatments for PFB (other than
shaving), then the plaintiffs would have lost. If the plaintiffs had lived
74. See id. at 360 (noting that "exemptions are made for medical reasons (typically
because of a skin condition called pseudo folliculitis barbae), but the Department refuses
to make exemptions for officers whose religious beliefs prohibit them from shaving their
beards").
75. For information on PFB, there are some diverse sites. See generally THE MERCK
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 116 (2001), available at
http://www.merck.com/pubs/mmanual/section I0/chapterl 16/116f.htm (last checked
February 4, 2002); Cheryl Guttman, Laser Targets PFB, DERMATOLOGY TIMES, Jan. 1,
2002, available at http://www.dermatologytimes.com/dermatologytimes/article/
articleDetail.jsp?id=6945 (last checked February 15, 2003).
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in a jurisdiction with few African-Americans, the plaintiffs would
have lost. If the plaintiffs had lived in a jurisdiction where African-
Americans are unlikely to be afflicted with PFB-warm weather,
some claim, lessens the intensity of PFB-the plaintiffs would have
lost. If the ADA had not been passed, or if it had been interpreted by
the police department as not requiring that the department exempt
sufferers of PFB from having to shave, the plaintiffs would have lost.
If there were simply no such thing as PFB-if the skin condition
simply did not exist-then the plaintiffs would have lost. The
plaintiffs in Newark were dependant on all of these factors, any one of
which would have prevented the plaintiffs claim.
So where is the great triumph for religious liberty? Newark has
been celebrated among academics as giving real substance to the
76general applicability inquiry and thus to free exercise. But the
Islamic police officers here are permitted to exercise their religion
only because of the underlying rate of incidence of an African-
American skin condition. What great principle of religious liberty
determined this case? The plaintiffs' victory here was a fluke.
In demographically different communities, with different
proportions of African-Americans and different climates, the
proportion of those afflicted with PFB might be such that there is no
secular medical exception to "no shaving" policies. In such a
community, plaintiffs under the exact same facts will lose." And the
factors bearing on whether a secular exception exists will not only
vary from place to place, but also from time to time. The plaintiffs in
Newark face a considerable problem in that, if they ever have to
return to court they may well lose. This is because the medical
76. Commentators have been extremely optimistic about the Newark decision. See, e.g.,
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious
Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 129 (citing Newark as an
example of how "after Smith and Flores, religious minorities and religious practice
continue to receive the kind of special judicial solicitude which the Carolene Products
doctrine recommends"); Duncan, supra note 30, at 883 (arguing that, in fact, "[t]he Free
Exercise Clause has evolved into a leaner, meaner religious-liberty-protecting machine in
the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Smith and Lukumi"); Thomas C.
Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They Are Wrong, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 417 (1999) (noting Newark as an example that "demonstrated the
potential" of the general applicability test in "protecting religion from thoughtless,
unnecessary governmental burdens"); Laycock, supra note 30, at 35 (stating that if other
courts followed Newark, "religious claimants can often prevail").
77. Obviously the facts are different; one plaintiff would have a constitutional
exemption and the other would not. The point I wish to make is that the facts that
determine whether or not an exemption is given are ones that we all can agree should be
irrelevant. See infra section Ill(B)(1).
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research on PFB is advancing; several potential cures for PFB are in
testing phases. 78 These cures would obviate the need for a secular
medical exception, which would, in the same breath, eviscerate the
claim for a religious exception. Plaintiffs like those in Newark must
hope that the advance of medical science does not preempt their
constitutional right to follow the teachings of the Qur'an.
The general applicability inquiry makes every free exercise claim a
matter of luck. Each religious claimant must rely on some secular
exception, but in order for a secular exception to arise, the law must
burden some secular interest group. The existence of a secular burden
depends on many factors, many of which seem like they should be
irrelevant to constitutional law. Plaintiffs depend on a fortuitous
conjoining of these random factors for their constitutional right. If the
stars do not align just right, then the plaintiffs constitutional right
79
evaporates.
2. Employment Division v. Smith
And while some plaintiffs (like those in Newark) will get
constitutionally lucky, other plaintiffs will see their constitutional
luck run out. In Newark, we saw that the religious claim for
exemption depended on the secular burdens created by the law, and
all the seemingly irrelevant factors that weighed into that
determination. Similarly, in cases where plaintiffs lose, their
constitutional claim fails principally because seemingly irrelevant
factors conspire to prevent a secular burden from ever arising.
The case that generated the neutral and generally applicable test,
Smith, helps illustrate the point. In Smith, two members of the Native
American Church sought unemployment compensation after being
fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting
peyote. Their applications for unemployment were denied because of
a state statute preventing distribution of unemployment compensation
78. See Guttman, supra note 75, at 46 (reporting scientific studies documenting how the
long-pulsed YAG laser is an effective option for treating pseudofollicultis barbae); Miriam
E. Tucker, Eflornithine Cream Helps Eliminate 'Razor Bumps' in Black Men, FAMILY
PRACTICE NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 9 (reporting epidemiological studies indicating how a
topical cream reduces the incidence of PFB).
79. 1 am tempted to make a remark about how freedom of religion now depends on an
alignment of stars when it used to be one of the few fixed stars in the constitutional
constellation. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(Jackson, J., for the Court).
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to those discharged for work-related misconduct. 80 Smith and Black
then sued, claiming a violation of their constitutional rights. Because
the complainants could not show that the neutral and generally
applicable standard was violated, the Supreme Court denied their• 81
claim. The Court in Smith implicitly held that there were no relevant
secular exceptions to the Oregon statutes prohibiting peyote use. This
scenario therefore is the easiest possible one to analyze under the
neutral and generally applicable standard, and the result is apparently
uncontroversial.
Let us examine Smith and the reasons why the claimants lost in the
same way that we analyzed why the claimants won in Newark. In
Newark, the regulation mandating that officers be clean-shaven had a
medical exception, which existed only because of the prevalence of a
skin condition that made it impossible for many African-American
officers to comply with the regulation. We noted above that the
religious claimant had this skin condition to thank for the success of
his religious liberty claim. Fortunately for the religious claimant, the
police regulation created a substantial secular burden, which gave rise
to the religious exemption. Without that secular burden, the claimants
in Newark would have lost.
The question then becomes, why did the law forbidding peyote use
not create any secular burdens? To answer that question, one has to
contemplate what sorts of secular burdens arise from restrictions on
drug use. Certainly, those who want to use the drug recreationally are
burdened. But that constituency certainly was not strong enough in
Smith; there simply was not a significant push for recreational peyote
use in Oregon.
80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
81. See id. at 879. Eventually, the Native American Church did receive an exemption
for peyote use. In 1994, the federal government amended the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act to protect religious peyote use by Native Americans in all states. See
American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108
Stat. 3125, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)). This exemption may be an excellent
indication of how legislatures are responsive to the needs of religious minorities. On the
other hand, it may simply be an example of how religious minorities need to lose in the
Supreme Court before anyone listens to them.
82. This actually was one of the crucial points that the plaintiffs tried to make in their
case. They believed that the lack of a recreational peyote scene in Oregon was a sign that
the government did not have a compelling interest in denying their religious claim for
peyote use. Instead, however, that fact worked against the plaintiffs because no secular
exception ever developed in the law. Of course, a secular exception of that magnitude
would render the whole legislative scheme unworkable and hence would be extremely
unlikely to develop.
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The other principal reason for the lack of secular burdens created
by an absolute prohibition on peyote use is that peyote happens to be
a relatively useless drug outside of Native American Church rituals.
Peyote, a hallucinogen derived from the plant lophophora williamsii
lemaire, is considered by the Drug Enforcement Agencsy to be a
"drug[] of abuse" that has "no known medical value." Because
peyote is a useless drug for medical purposes, Oregon's complete
prohibition on it likely raised no qualms in the secular community.
Just as the constitutional win in Newark was based on some factors
that seemed irrelevant, the loss in Smith was based on equally
immaterial factors. If peyote had some strong medicinal value there
might well have been a sizeable medical exception in the statute, and
so the plaintiffs may have won. The plaintiffs may also have won if
they had sought to use some other drug, like Prozac perhaps, that had. 84
medical value and was frequently used, for the statutes regulating
these types of drugs are littered with exceptions, most notably for
routine medical treatment.85
One must also note that secular burdens can change over time. In
Newark, we saw that if treatments for PFB were developed, the
Islamic officers' constitutional claim might dissipate. Just as a win
might become a loss, so a loss may become a win. Modem research
on peyote suggests that it may yet have some medical value.
Researchers at Harvard Medical School have for years been studying
peyote, as it may be of use in curing everything from long-term
memory problems to schizophrenia to depression. 8 If some medical
83. Sandra Blakeslee, Scientists Test Hallucinogens for Mental Ills, N.Y. TIMES, March
13, 2001, at FI.
84. Use of such antidepressants is continually on the rise. See Carl T. Hall, Depression
Treatment Rates Increasing; Threefold Rise Seen Since 1987 in Study, S. F. CHRON., Jan.
9, 2002, at Al (reporting that over six million people were using Prozac in outpatient
therapy in 1997); Leonard H. Glantz, Research With Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213,
218 n.55 (1998) (noting that Prozac was prescribed nearly 350,000 times in a year for
treatment of depression and obsessive compulsive disorder in children under sixteen).
Catharine Cookson points out that the drug the Native American Church chose, peyote, is
far safer than drugs like Librium, which is on the market to treat anxiety and depression.
She concludes, "Treating anxiety and depression is useful, and thus to society the drug is
worth the substantial risks. The worship of God apparently is not as useful, and thus it is
not worth even the most minimal risks." CATHARINE COOKSON, THE COURTS AND THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 136 (2001).
85. Most of these statutes have general exceptions for bona fide purposes consistent
with both the general prohibition and medical use. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(proscribing the distribution of controlled substances generally); 21 U.S.C. § 829(b)(excepting from the general proscription Schedule III substances, like Ritalin, when
properly prescribed by a practitioner for medical use).
86. Blakeslee, supra note 82 at Fl. Somewhat ironically, the Native American Church
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benefit to peyote can be established, this may create a secular medical
exception for peyote use-just like the secular medical exception in
Newark-which may mandate a religious exception. Smith may be
overruled, not because of a change in the constitutional test, but
because peyote may turn out to be useful after all.
Smith, like Newark, illustrates the unprincipled nature of free
exercise exemptions under the general applicability inquiry. As will
be discussed in more detail in the next section, irrelevant factors seem
to dominate the question whether a particular law creates secular
burdens, thereby dominating the whole constitutional inquiry. This
makes the entire Free Exercise Clause a sort of joke. One could say
that any tension between Newark and Smith-the reason why an
Islamic officer has a right to wear a beard in religious obedience, but
a Native American has no right to engage in religious ritual-can best
be explained by the fact that while not shaving is sometimesS87
medically necessary, peyote never is. This does not seem to be a
proper way of doing constitutional law.
A. The Underlying Factors on Which the
Constitutional Right Depends
As we have seen in our discussions of Newark and Smith, a
is now helping with a study on peyote for the National Institute on Drug Abuse. See id
(reporting how McLeans Hospital in Boston will conduct a study, financed by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, involving members of the Native American Church). There are
ongoing discussions as to whether peyote might have other significant uses as well. See
Lester Grinspoon & Rich Doblin, Psychedelics as Catalysts of Insight-Oriented
Psychotherapy, SOCIAL RESEARCH, Sept. 22, 2001, at 677-78 (suggesting that peyote may
have medical use as a psychotherapeutic agent); David O'Reilly, Drugs Were His Door to
the Sacred, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 18, 2000, at J7. (reporting Huston Smith's spiritual
encounters arising from peyote use).
87. As we discussed earlier, religious groups have tried a variety of approaches to
ameliorate the perceived negative effects of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). States have developed statutory and constitutional
protections for religious observers. Congress too has reentered the fray by passing the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
Without being snide, the nature of the general applicability test is such that religious
groups should recognize that they may have an interest in passing laws that do not directly
give them exemptions. A strengthened version of the ADA that grafts medical exceptions
onto every law may well open the door for religious practitioners to raise their free
exercise claims. Given both the Supreme Court's current constitutional interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause and its propensity to prevent Congress from broadening its
protection, it is not silly to suggest that an enhanced version of the ADA could help
religious claimants more than a new version of RFRA. Of course, this should be taken
with a grain of a salt, especially given that the Supreme Court's determination to limit
Congress' ability to provide anti-discrimination rights is not confined to free exercise. See,
e.g., Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA
could not be supported under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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religious petitioner's claim for an exemption from a law critically
depends on what secular burdens the law creates. But, as we have
seen, the secular burdens that a law creates are a random product of
various factors, which often seem irrelevant to the constitutional
question. It will then be unsurprising to learn that the test is often
completely unresponsive to factors that most may think more relevant
to the constitutional inquiry, such as the government's interest in
denying an exception and the claimant's interest in receiving one.
1. Irrelevant Factors
The general applicability test puts center stage the existence of
secular exceptions (and thus the existence of secular burdens) in
determining whether a religious claimant should get an exception.
From the discussions of Newark and Smith, we see that many factors
can affect whether secular burdens arise from the challenged laws. It
seems impossible to delimit the factors affecting the general
applicability inquiry; it seems better just to summarize some
observations.
Ultimately, whether secular burdens develop in response to any
particular law will have much to do with the makeup of the relevant
constituency where the law applies. In Newark, we saw that the
religious exemption was due in part to the underlying incidence of the
condition PFB, which in turn was due to the presence of an African-
American population. If there had been fewer African-Americans in88.,
Newark, the Islamic officers' religious claim would have failed. The
existence of secular burdens is always going to hinge on what types of
populations are present in the community. Different populations will
have different secular burdens; in the case of Newark, an African-
American community will be adversely impacted by a clean-shaven
rule in a way that a predominantly Caucasian community will not.
Consequently, Islamic officers--or a member of any religion that is
forbidden from shaving (such as Hasidic Jews, for example) 89-
88. African-Americans in Newark make up more than half of the city's population. See
U.S. Census, Quick Tables: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (2000), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/bf/ lang=en vt name=DEC_2000SF1 U_QTP3_geo-id=16
000US3451000.html. Nationally, African-Americans make up only 12.8% of the
population. See U.S. Census, Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin (2000) available at http://www.census.gov/population/
estimates/nation/intfile3- 1 .txt.
89. For an interesting discussion of the topic, see Neal Conan, Talk of the Nation:
Politics of Hair (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 21, 2001) (discussing the biblical injunction
against hair trimming followed in Hasidic circles). One potential Supreme Court case dealt
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should think seriously about living in an African-American
community before living with Caucasians.
Other cases, such as Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. Borough of
Tenafly9  and Rader v. Johnston,9 1 also expose the role that
demographic factors can play in exemption analysis. In the Tenafly
case, a group of Orthodox Jewish residents sought permission to
attach lechis, which are thin black strips of plastic, along
neighborhood utility poles. In doing so, the residents were attempting
to create an eruv, a ceremonial demarcation of a particular area.
Creating an eruv allows Orthodox Jews, who are usually forbidden
from pushing or carrying objects outside their homes on the Sabbath,
to conceive of the entire space within the eruv as their home. Without
an eruv, Orthodox Jews who have small children or who are disabled
cannot attend synagogue on the Sabbath. 92 The Third Circuit granted
the residents a preliminary injunction against enforcement of an
ordinance forbidding signs on public places because the rule was not
enforced in a generally applicable manner. The Third Circuit relied
upon the fact that, among other exceptions, the Borough had allowed
orange ribbons to remain on utility poles during a controversy over
school regionalization and the fact that residents often nailed their
93
address number signs to utility poles. As these exceptions were
necessary to the result, the clear implication is, of course, that if the
Orthodox Jews had lived in a community where people posted their
address numbers over their doors and where the school district was
not embroiled in political controversy, the Orthodox Jews living there
would have no right to an eruv.
Rader can be viewed in the same way. The plaintiff in Rader was
an eighteen-year-old freshman at the University of Nebraska who
wanted an exemption from the University's parietal rule that required
with a Hasidic Jew being required to shave his hair while in an Alabama prison, but
certiorari was never granted. See Goulden v. Oliver, 442 U.S. 922 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
90. 309 F.3d at 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
91. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
92. Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 152.
93. Id. at 151-52.
94. 1 must confess that this discussion oversimplifies the case in Tenafly. The Borough
made several other exceptions to the rule; it permitted local churches to post permanent
directional signs, residents to post lost animal signs, and the local Chamber of Commerce
to affix holiday displays. Id. at 151-52. My point, however, remains. All of the secular
exceptions seem traceable to idiosyncratic factors about the Borough of Tenafly that may
not exist in other communities. It seems instinctive to question the sense of an exemption
system that makes religious claimants' rights contingent on such factors.
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freshman students to live on-campus. Rader, believing that many of
the things that went on in on-campus life were immoral and would
threaten his spiritual life, wanted to live in the Christian Fellowship
house. When the University denied his request, Rader sued.95 The
University's on-campus policy had three written exceptions, for
students nineteen years or older, for married students, and for students
living with their parents. There also was an individualized exception
for those who could convince school administrators that an exception
96
was really necessary. Because of these exceptions, the district court
held that the rule was not generally applicable and gave Rader an
exemption to the University's rule. One wonders how Rader would
have fared if he had lived in a time or place where there were few
older, married, and commuting students. Of course, I do not mean to
insinuate that Rader would necessarily have lost; universities will
often have exceptions to their parietal rules even if they do not have a
significant number of students demanding such exceptions because of
the norms and expectations prevalent in larger society. Yet Rader,
like Tenafly, demonstrates the very veiled, yet potentially9Powerful,
way in which demographic factors can govern free exercise.
Demographic factors are, of course, not the only factors that play
into the constitutional analysis. Any factor that enters into whether
secular burdens will develop is a potentially relevant factor in general
applicability analysis. Our analysis of Smith and Newark shows that
the state of medical knowledge can play a role in religious exemption
analysis. In Smith, the lack of pharmacological benefits in peyote
made its prohibition acceptable in the secular world. In Newark, lack
of medical treatments for PFB made an absolute prohibition against
shaving unworkable. Since the risk to human life and safety is one
that is taken most seriously in society, it seems likely that the first
exception a statute will have is an exception for medical reasons.
It should come as no surprise that there is real harm in this sort of
exemptions analysis. One harm that should be flagged is that because
95. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1543-44.
96. See id. at 1551-53.
97. Rader and Tenafly also illustrate another principle. Granting a religious exemption
in Newark based on the secular medical exception made sense in at least one minor
respect. There is a certain logic in analogizing a person's medical needs to another
religious needs, even if that logic could not withstand scrutiny. In Rader and Tenafly,
however, the incongruity between the existing secular exceptions and the religious claim is
transparent even at first glance. It would take a clever commentator indeed to
conceptualize the desire of school employees to post yellow ribbons as being similar to
desire of Orthodox Jews to build an eruv.
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the general applicability inquiry depends on so many demographic
factors, results will vary in different populations. Aziz and Mustafa
may be exempt from the no-shaving policy in Newark where there are
significant numbers of African-Americans, but perhaps not in Idaho,
where there are virtually none.98 Orthodox Jews may have the right to
build eruvs in communities that generally permit public postings, but
not in others that forbid it. Such a constitutional test undermines the
uniformity of the Constitution.
More obviously, however, the major complaint about this sort of
exemptions analysis is that it makes no sense. To give a religious
exemption to an Islamic officer to follow the teachings of the Qur'an
because of the prevalence of an African-American skin condition
violates our instinctive notions about how exemptions should be
granted, as does denying a religious exemption to Native Americans
to use peyote in their religious rituals simply because peyote has no
known medical use. These irrelevant factors have no importance in
themselves; nor (as we shall see) do they correlate with factors we
may think are relevant to the constitutional analysis, such as the
government's interest in denying an exemption or a claimant's
interest in obtaining one.
2. Not Keyed To Important Interests
Since the general applicability test is keyed to irrelevant factors, it
should come as no surprise that it is unresponsive to what might be
considered the important factors in determining the appropriateness of
a religious exemption. The state's interest opposing the grant of an
exception and the religious claimant's in obtaining one are factors that
neither appear explicitly in the general applicability calculus or that
correlate well with its results.
a. The Government's Interest
The generally applicable requirement relies on a tacit assumption:
the presence or absence of secular exceptions is a good indication of
98. The African-American population in New Jersey makes up 13.4% of the total
population and over half of the population of Newark, while making up only 0.3% of the
population in Idaho. See U.S. Census Bureau, The Black Population: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-5.pdf. This means that the African-
American population, per capita, is roughly forty times greater in New Jersey than in
Idaho, and over one hundred and fifty times greater in Newark. In practical terms, this may
make location decisive in an inquiry like the one in Newark.
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the government's interest. On one level, this seems a sensible
inference; the stronger the government's interest, the stronger its
unwillingness will be to make secular exceptions in the rule.
Similarly, if a governmental interest is weak, one could expect secular
exceptions.
Yet these presuppositions are misleading, if not altogether untrue.
There are many cases that involve a generally applicable statute
where the government has only a weak interest in the statute's
execution. Cases involving a religious objection to a 9 overnment-
ordered autopsy are excellent examples of this point. In Yang v.
Sturner, a case initially decided before Smith, a district judge awarded
relief to a Hmong couple who brought suit against a medical
examiner for doing an autopsy on their son without their consent.
After Smith was decided, however, the district court reconsidered its
decision and ruled, reluctantly, for the government. Though the judge
found that the government had almost no interest in performing an
autopsy and was ignoring the passionate emotional objections of the
Hmong couple (and people generally), the district judge found that
the Free Exercise Clause, under Smith, could not stop the autopsy. 00
Yang is not an isolated case. In Montgomery v. County of Clinton,101
Michigan, Sannie Montgomery refused to pull over when he was
speeding. A high speed chase ensued, in which Montgomery lost
99. Such cases still arise even after Smith. See, e.g., United States v. Hammer, 121 F.
Supp. 2d 794 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 644 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, Michigan, 743
F.Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F.Supp. 558 (D.R.I.), withdrawn,
750 F.Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
100. Professor Laycock provides an excellent summary of the district judge's
reflections in Yang:
In Yang v. Sturner, a distressed district judge held that Smith left him powerless
to do anything about an unnecessary autopsy performed on a young Hmong man.
The judge movingly described the deep grief of the victim's family, the obvious
emotional pain of the many Hmongs who came to witness the trial, and his own
deep regret at being forced to uphold a profound violation of their religious
liberty. He describes an autopsy done largely out of medical curiosity with no
suspicion of foul play, with no authorization in Rhode Island law, and without
the slightest regard for the family's religious beliefs. But under Smith, the state
does not need a good reason, or even any reason at all.
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 221, 226
(1993). Laycock also noted the profound denigration inherent in an autopsy for many
religious groups. "Several minority religions in America have strong teachings against
mutilation of the human body, and they view autopsies as a form of mutilation. Faith
groups with such teachings include many Jews, Navajo Indians, and the Hmong, an
immigrant population from Laos. The Hmong believe that if an autopsy is performed, the
spirit of the deceased will never be free." Id.
101. 743 F.Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
No. 21
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
control of his automobile and crashed it. Montgomery died as the
police arrived. The police thought it obvious that the cause of
Montgomery's death was the car crash-they were witnesses to
Sannie's "having sustained massive head and upper body injuries" in
the crash. °2 Montgomery belonged to a family of conservative Jews,
who objected to an autopsy on religious grounds. They argued that an
autopsy was unnecessary to determine cause of death because it was
obvious. The state seemed to agree with this point, but insisted that an
autopsy was mandated by state statutes, which required an autopsy
case in all cases of violent death. The court permitted the state to
conduct an autopsy, which apparently had no purpose given that there
was no indication of foul play or use of drugs in the accident. The
district judge called the decision "regrettable," but stated that under
Smith, while "local officials making decisions concerning the care and
disposition ought to proceed conscientiously and with great sensitivity
to the emotional and religious sensibilities of the next of kind," there103
was no constitutional requirement that they do so.
The best example of how the government will often insist on an
autopsy without much of a reason is the Hammer case. Hammer is, in
some ways, a typical autopsy case, where the plaintiff files suit for
injunctive relief to stop the government from ordering an autopsy.
The government alleges it has strong reasons that justify an autopsy;
the plaintiff argues that an autopsy would be incompatible with his
religious beliefs. 104 What differentiates Hammer from the rest of the
autopsy cases, however, is the context. Hammer was a soon-to-be-
executed federal inmate who was trying to prevent his own body from
being autopsied after death. Hammer raised the obvious point: What
interest did the government have in performing an autopsy to
establish the plaintiff's cause of death when the government had just• . 105
executed the plaintiff? David Hammer won this case, as it was
102. Id. at 1255.
103. Id. at 1259 n.4.
104. United States v. Hammer, 121 F. Supp. 2d 794 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
105. The government's position, one must admit, is not as absurd as it seems at first
glance. The government argued that it need to conduct an autopsy to protect itself from a
lawsuit by Hammer's next of kin. The government was apparently worried that Hammer's
next of kin might allege that Hammer may have been beaten before his execution.
Hammer, however, said he was willing to swear a statement before his execution that he
had not been abused by prison personnel, have photographs taken of his body to prove the
lack of abuse, and have his execution videotaped. The government had no response to
Hammer's proffers. In comparing the government's and Hammer's interests, the court
only remarked that "Mr. Hammer's religious belief far outweighs the government's
interest in an autopsy." Id. at 802.
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decided under RFRA's compelling-interest standard, but it seems
that if it had been governed by the general applicability standard,
Hammer may well have lost.l17
These cases have a common theme: they all involve generally
applicable statutes that requiring autopsies in broad categories of
cases even when the government has almost no interest in an autopsy
in the particular case at bar. 08 As a general matter, one tends to think
that the governmental interest in the execution of a statute will be
reflected in the amount and severity of the exceptions in that statute.
As we have seen in the autopsy cases, however, this is a very weak
tendency, if it exists at all.
Professor Volokh points out that the government can have a strong
interest in the execution of a statute even when the statute hasS 109
significant exceptions. As the autopsy cases reveal, however,
Volokh's point has an obvious contrapositive that is equally true. Just
as statutes that serve strong governmental interests will often have
exceptions, statutes that serve weak governmental interests will often
be uniform. This effectively insulates them from judicial review
insofar as the Free Exercise Clause is concerned, but that is not
evidence of strong governmental interest.
Together, these two points damn the general applicability test. In
short, the presence or absence of secular exceptions tells us virtually
nothing about the strength of the governmental interest in denying the
religious observer an exception. There may be cases where a strong
governmental interest coincides with a uniform statute-and Smith
may be an example-but there are many cases where that is not true.
Take, again, a statute that generally requires autopsies to be
performed. There may be strong or weak governmental interests
behind any particular application of the statute. Sometimes the cause
106. Hammer was a federal inmate and the Third Circuit had already upheld RFRA as a
matter of federal law. See supra note 26.
107. The statute requiring an autopsy is written in absolute form, but has an exception
for a coroner's discretion. See Hammer, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 800-01 ("Immediately after
execution, a postmortem examination of the body of the inmate shall be made at the
discretion of the coroner of the county in which the execution is performed.").
108. Of course, there are times where the government may have a strong interest in
performing an autopsy. See, e.g, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 645 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (upholding the state's ordering of an autopsy of a
Kickapoo Indian over the Tribe's objections because the cause of her death was unclear
and her mother insisted that she had been murdered). My point is merely that the general
applicability requirement makes no distinction between these cases.
109. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1540 (noting that "virtually all laws, including those
widely seen as aiming at quite serious harms" have secular exceptions).
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of death is uncertain; sometimes it is clear. But by requiring an
autopsy in every circumstance, the general applicability test reveals
that it is completely unresponsive to the governmental interest at
stake.
Courts have recognized the unresponsiveness of the general
applicability inquiry. Before Smith, several exceptions existed in the
compelling-interest test. Because of the innate governmental interest,
the government usually had to meet only a reasonable standard in the9 110
prison, military, and tax contexts. Despite the fact that Smith said
nothing about these exceptions-a silence that seemed to infer that
they were no longer necessary-most courts still insist that prison,
tax, and military legislation face only limited scrutiny."1
These end runs around Smith makes sense as a way courts can
make the Free Exercise Clause responsive to situations where the
government has a strong interest, despite the unresponsive general
applicability test. Jackson v. District of Columbia, for example,
dealt with a state prison policy requiring all inmates to shave in order
to eliminate contraband, reduce gang activity, and maintain order. A
class of plaintiffs challenged this policy, claiming their religions
required them not to shave. The rule itself was generally applicable,
110. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (noting that a prison
regulation that impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506
(1986) (holding that free exercise rights in the military are diminished in light of the fact
that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society");
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)) (noting that the "'broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs'
justifies tax legislation even though it may infringe the free exercise rights of some
claimants).
11. In the prison context, "most Courts of Appeals have taken the second approach,
simply continuing to apply Turner and OLone in analyzing prisoners' constitutional
rights." Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (summarizing the
separate Free Exercise Clause standard that should be applied in the prison context). In the
tax content, one circuit court-following Hernandez-held that a tax burden could only
violate the Free Exercise Clause through "the most explicit demonstration that a
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes." Klaassen v. Commissioner, No. 98-9035, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6320, at *10
(10th Cir. Apr.7, 1999) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)) (holding
that a claimant who had ten children could not get an exemption from the tax scheme
which gave certain exemptions only to those having eight or less children, even though the
claimant's religion proscribed birth control). Lastly, Goldman has also been widely
followed post-Smith. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that police officers had no right to wear religious pins, in part because uniform
standards are "appropriate restrictions on the First Amendment rights of government
employees").
112. 89 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000).
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except for a medical exception allowina afflicted inmates to "grow
facial hair up to half an inch in length." The trial judge noted just
how similar this case was to Newark, stating that "the grooming
policy and medical exception at issue here are nearly identical to
those considered in Fraternal Order."' 14 This could have posed some
difficulty for the trial judge-the increased governmental interest in
the prison context did not seem to enter into the general applicability
calculus. But the judge relied on the O'Lone doctrine, noting that
there was one "pivotal difference" between this case and Newark:S ,115
"the plaintiffs here are in prison."
In summary, the general applicability inquiry is poorly attuned to
the strength of the governmental interest. The presence or absence of
exceptions is a poor proxy for governmental interest, and the fact that
exceptionless statutes block free exercise claims absolutely means
that even statutes representing weak governmental interests are
constitutionally immune as long as they are uniform. The fact that the
test is poorly calibrated with governmental interest also explains the
persistence of ancillary doctrines in free exercise, such as the O Lone,
Goldman, and Hernandez doctrines, in which courts need to turn
away cases where the general applicability test might otherwise
mandate an exception.
b. The Religious Claimant's Interest
The general applicability inquiry relies on a loose proxy to
represent the government's interest in a free exercise case: the
presence or absence of exceptions in the legislative scheme. There is
no corresponding proxy for the religious claimant's interest. There is
not even a fiction that the religious claimant's interest is part of the
general applicability analysis.
Smith itself is a perfect example. Smith was somewhat unlike many
of the religious liberty cases that had come before the Supreme Court.
Some of the Supreme Court cases addressed whether religious
claimants had the right to worship in a particular place,16 or to be free
113. Id. at 51.
114. Id. at 69. There are a surprising number of prison cases with facts very similar to
Newark. They all come out in the government's favor. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 394 (D.Md. 2002) (holding that a Rastafarian had no constitutional right to wear
dreadlocks in violation of the prison's policy because the medical exception applied only
to the rule requiring no facial hair, not to the rule requiring a military-style haircut).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
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of fiscal burdens that impacted their ability to worship."17 Some cases
dealt with the rights of protestors who objected to war on religious118
grounds; others dealt with claimants who were in the criminal119
justice system, or those that could have been said to have waived
their rights by entering into military service or receiving some other
governmental benefit. 170
Without minimizing the importance of the religious claimant's
interest in these cases, one can see that in Smith, there was something
very serious at stake-nothing less than the ability of a whole people
to practice a central ritual of their faith. With such an important issue
at stake, one would think that part of the Court's analysis would
evaluate Oregon's drug law in light of these strong religious interests.
But, as many commentators have noted, the Court paid virtually no
attention to the religious interest in the case. How could it? The
general applicability test the Court laid out takes no notice of the
religious interest. Contrast the analysis in Smith with that of Yoder. In
Yoder, the Court went on and on about the deleterious effects that
forced education would have on the Amish way of life. In Smith, the
Court is noticeably silent on the impact its ruling will have on Native
Americans because that impact is not relevant to the constitutional
inquiry.
In fact, not only has the religious claimant's interest disappeared
from the constitutional inquiry, the Court has emphasized how its
disappearance is a step forward for religious exercise. The Court
noted that the centrality of a claimant's belief is "not within the
judicial ken," and stated, "It is no more appropriate for judges to
determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a
compelling-interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before applying the
(1988) (permitting the government to allow timber companies to construct a road through
a Native American sacred space).
117. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the
IRS' denial of non-profit status to a racially discriminatory school did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause); United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974)
(holding that Quaker employers had no right under the Free Exercise Clause to withhold
portions of income taxes attributable to military purposes, despite their religious pacifism).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971).
119. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
120. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986).
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compelling interest test in the free speech field." 121 Of course,
centrality and importance are not quite the same thing, but they seem
positively related. Neither, however, are of any importance in the
general applicability regime that Smith 
sets up.
3. Smith, Balancing, and the Cost-Benefit State
Over the last two sections, we have explored how the general
applicability inquiry is unresponsive to the government's and the
religious claimant's interest. Whether a law is generally applicable or
not signifies little as to whether the government has a strong interest
in giving an exemption to it, or whether the religious claimant has a
strong interest in obtaining such an exemption.
In the Sherbert line of cases, the court used a compelling-interest
test to determine whether to give an exemption. The court looked
straightforwardly and directly at the government's interest and tried to
balance it against the religious claimant's interest. The degree to
which a religious exemption would compromise legitimate
governmental goals was the cost of the exemption; the degree to
which a religious exemption aided religious claimants in pursuing
their spiritual goals was its benefit.
123
121. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
122. There is no doubt that measuring a religious claimant's interest in an exemption
was a difficult task; courts saw two chief harms in determining the centrality of a religious
claimant's request for exemption. First, there was the harm that judges may mistakenly
deny a religious claimant an exemption by believing that his religious claim is not central
to his religion. Second, there was the harm of the centrality inquiry itself; many critics
argued that it imposed an overly intrusive burden on the claimant. See David E. Steinberg,
Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 241, 291-94 (1995) (detailing these harms). Professor Steinberg, after considering
these harms in detail, found them to be unpersuasive reasons for giving up on the
centrality inquiry, arguing that it was not "as troubling as opponents of constitutionally
compelled religious exemptions suggest." Id. at 293. As for the first harm, he notes that it
seems strange to conclude that because some religious exemptions may be inappropriately
denied, religious exemptions should therefore be categorically denied. As for the second
harm, Steinberg notes that the religious claimant can weigh the emotional harm inherent in
the centrality inquiry in deciding whether or not to bring a free exercise claim. It seems
odd to argue that plaintiffs are better off by being prevented from bringing a claim at all.
123. Although it is a minor point, it is interesting to note that Sherbert was essentially a
cost-benefit approach to religious exceptions. Smith's renunciation of such an approach
seems odd in a regulatory state dominated by cost-benefit analyses. See Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 1993, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (requiring governmental
agencies to consider the cost-benefit ratio in regulation decisions); see generally COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew
D. Adler & Eric. A. Posner eds., 2001). In a society where the decision to regulate is so
often made by an evaluation of the costs and benefits of regulation, it seems remarkable
that the decision to exempt religious believers from the regulation pays no attention either
to the cost or benefit of exempting religious believers. See supra section III(B)(2). A test
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This leads to another criticism of Smith. One of the strongest
justifications for the Smith decision was that it took the balancing of
competing interests out of the hands of the judiciary. But the regime
that Smith has set up still involves balancing. Before Smith, the
judiciary would balance the religious interest directly against the state
interest, in a cost-benefit sort of way. After Smith, the judiciary
measures the religious and the state interests indirectly-by looking at
the presence or absence of secular exceptions as indicative of the
religious and state interests-and then tries to compare secular
exceptions with a possible religious exception. Judges still balance
factors after Smith just as much as they did before it-that is evident
every time a judge tries to determine whether a religious exception
does as much harm to the legislature's rule as an existing secular
exception. The only thing that has changed is that now judges balance
irrelevant factors-the "new" balancing pays no attention to the
important concerns: the governmental and religious interest in
granting or denying an exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
Commentators have viewed recent cases, like Newark, Tenafly, and124
Rader, with great optimism. In the wake of Smith, these cases have
given hope to many that a broad notion of the general applicability
test will protect religious adherents from legislative hostility and
indifference. Professor Duncan opened a recent article by remarking,
"The Free Exercise Clause is the Mark Twain of Constitutional Law,
because the recent report of its death 'was an exaggeration.'
125
I hope to dispel this optimism, or at least, suggest that it is
exaggerated. While the new Free Exercise Clause may seem a
principled way of instantiating a disparate-treatment right for
religious believers into free exercise, it is really an unprincipled and
bizarre manner of distributing constitutional exemptions. General
applicability puts a premium on luck; Islamic officers must hope that
they live in communities with skin conditions; Native Americans
must hope peyote develops medical usefulness. Instead of granting or
denying exceptions on the strength of the governmental and religious
interests at issue, the general applicability requirement doles out
exceptions in an almost completely random fashion. Free exercise can
less calibrated to cost-benefit factors could hardly be designed.
124. See supra note 76.
125. Duncan, supra note 30, at 850.
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either grow into a full-fledged substantive right or devolve into a
simple prohibition on intentional discrimination, but the current
arrangement is a primitive attempt to split the difference that is
completely out of accord with our intuitions and that will ultimately
satisfy neither side.
